CanisterWorm Incident Response

genie sec scan --all-homes --root "$PWD"

genie sec scan --all-homes --root /srv/app --root /opt/service --root "$PWD"

genie sec scan --json --all-homes --root "$PWD"

# Caminho padrão
cat ~/.bun/install/global/node_modules/@automagik/genie/package.json 2>/dev/null | grep '"version"'
cat ~/.bun/install/global/node_modules/pgserve/package.json 2>/dev/null | grep '"version"'

# Caminho alternativo (bun mais recente)
cat ~/.cache/.bun/install/global/node_modules/@automagik/genie/package.json 2>/dev/null | grep '"version"'
cat ~/.cache/.bun/install/global/node_modules/pgserve/package.json 2>/dev/null | grep '"version"'

npm ls -g @automagik/genie pgserve 2>&1

ls ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "genie@4\.260421\.(3[3-9]|40)"
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "pgserve@1\.1\.(1[1-4])"
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "genie@4\.260421\.(3[3-9]|40)"
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "pgserve@1\.1\.(1[1-4])"

genie@4.260421.36@@@1
pgserve@1.1.14@@@1

# genie — harvester de credenciais + chave RSA pública do atacante
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.*@@@1/dist/env-compat.cjs 2>/dev/null
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.*@@@1/dist/public.pem 2>/dev/null

# pgserve — payload TeamPCP
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.1*@@@1/scripts/check-env.js 2>/dev/null

# Caminhos alternativos
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.*@@@1/dist/env-compat.cjs 2>/dev/null
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.1*@@@1/scripts/check-env.js 2>/dev/null

systemctl --user status pgmon 2>&1 | head -5
ls -la ~/.config/systemd/user/pgmon.service 2>&1
ls -la /tmp/pglog /tmp/pg_log /tmp/.pg* 2>&1

python3 -c "import site; print('\n'.join(site.getsitepackages()))" 2>/dev/null | while read d; do
  ls "$d"/*.pth 2>/dev/null
done

# Procurar strings associadas ao TeamPCP
python3 -c "import site; print('\n'.join(site.getsitepackages()))" 2>/dev/null | while read d; do
  grep -l -E "pgserve|canister|icp0|api-monitor" "$d"/*.pth 2>/dev/null
done

ss -tnp 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "api-monitor|icp0|tdtqy|cjn37|143\.198\.237\.25"

# Systemd
systemctl --user stop pgmon 2>/dev/null
systemctl --user disable pgmon 2>/dev/null
rm -f ~/.config/systemd/user/pgmon.service
rm -f /tmp/pglog /tmp/pg_log
systemctl --user daemon-reload

# .pth suspeitos (se encontrados no 2.6)
# Remover manualmente os arquivos suspeitos identificados

# genie — versões maliciosas 4.260421.33 a 4.260421.40
for v in 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40; do
  rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.${v}@@@1
  rm -rf ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.${v}@@@1
done

# pgserve — versões maliciosas 1.1.11 a 1.1.14
for v in 11 12 13 14; do
  rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.${v}@@@1
  rm -rf ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.${v}@@@1
done

# Verificar que limpou
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "genie@4\.260421"
ls ~/.bun/install/cache/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "pgserve@1\.1\.1[1-4]"
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "genie@4\.260421"
ls ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "pgserve@1\.1\.1[1-4]"

bun install -g @automagik/genie@4.260422.4
bun install -g pgserve@1.1.10

cat ~/.npmrc  # ver token atual
# Rotacionar em: https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<user>/tokens
# Atualizar ~/.npmrc com o novo token (escopo mínimo, 2FA obrigatório)

cat ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml  # ver contas logadas
# Rotacionar em: https://github.com/settings/tokens
gh auth login  # re-autenticar após revogar

ls -la ~/.ssh/id_*
# Gerar nova chave
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "seu@email.com" -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_new
# Adicionar nova chave pública em todos os servidores/GitHub
# Remover chave comprometida de todos os authorized_keys
# Substituir ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 pela nova

ls ~/.aws/credentials
# Rotacionar em: AWS Console → IAM → Access Keys
aws sts get-caller-identity  # verificar que novas creds estão ativas

ls ~/.config/gcloud/
gcloud auth revoke --all
gcloud auth login

ls ~/.azure/
az logout
az login
# Rotacionar service principals em: portal.azure.com → App registrations → Certificates & secrets

# Rotacionar tokens de service account
# Rotacionar kubeconfig e contextos com acesso a produção
cat ~/.kube/config | grep -E "certificate-authority-data|token"

cat ~/.docker/config.json
# Rotacionar credenciais de cada registry (Docker Hub, ECR, GCR, GHCR, OCIR, etc.)

# Encontrar todos os .env no workspace
find ~/workspace ~ -maxdepth 5 -name ".env*" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Para cada um: rotacionar todas as chaves/tokens que ele contém

# Listar versões publicadas recentemente de cada pacote seu
npm view <seu-pacote> versions --json | tail -10
npm view <seu-pacote> time --json | tail -20

npm unpublish <pacote>@<versao>  # remove a versão contaminada (se dentro da janela de 72h)
npm deprecate <pacote>@<versao> "Malicious — CanisterWorm supply-chain attack"

{
  "dependencies": {
    "@automagik/genie": "4.260422.4",
    "pgserve": "1.1.10"
  }
}

npm config set ignore-scripts true
# ou
bun install --ignore-scripts

crontab -l | grep -E "update|genie|pgserve"
systemctl --user list-timers | grep -E "update|genie"
tmux show-options -g status-right 2>/dev/null | grep update

~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.<33-40>@@@1/dist/env-compat.cjs
~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.<33-40>@@@1/dist/public.pem
~/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.<11-14>@@@1/scripts/check-env.js

iptables -I OUTPUT -d 143.198.237.25 -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --algo bm --string "api-monitor.com" -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --algo bm --string "icp0.io" -j LOG --log-prefix "[CANISTERWORM-C2] "

# Replace <pid-from-findings> with each PID from the scan JSON report:
#   scan_id=$(genie sec scan --json --all-homes --root "$PWD" | jq -r '.scan_id')
#   jq -r '.findings[] | select(.category=="live_process") | .pid' \
#     "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$scan_id/report.json"
ps -o pid=,comm=,args= -p <pid-from-findings>

# Archive the full process table too, in case the scanner missed a child:
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,etime,comm,args > /tmp/ps-snapshot-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ).txt

iptables -I OUTPUT -d 143.198.237.25 -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --algo bm --string "api-monitor.com" -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --algo bm --string "icp0.io" -j LOG --log-prefix "[CANISTERWORM-C2] "
iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --algo bm --string "icp0.io" -j DROP

cat >/etc/pf.anchors/canisterworm <<'EOF'
block drop out quick to 143.198.237.25
block drop out quick proto tcp to any port 443 \
  host { "telemetry.api-monitor.com", "cjn37-uyaaa-aaaac-qgnva-cai.raw.icp0.io", \
         "tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io" }
EOF
echo 'anchor "canisterworm"' >> /etc/pf.conf
echo 'load anchor "canisterworm" from "/etc/pf.anchors/canisterworm"' >> /etc/pf.conf
pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf -e

netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="CanisterWorm-C2-IP"     dir=out action=block remoteip=143.198.237.25
# Domain-based blocking on Windows requires a WFP filter or upstream DNS sinkhole —
# if your fleet uses a DNS RPZ, push telemetry.api-monitor.com, cjn37-uyaaa-aaaac-qgnva-cai.raw.icp0.io,
# and tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io there.

# Exit 0 = signature + provenance both pass against the pinned identity.
genie sec verify-install

# Full scan, persisted JSON report, all home directories, filesystem root.
# GENIE_SEC_SCAN_DISABLED must be unset for this call.
unset GENIE_SEC_SCAN_DISABLED
genie sec scan --all-homes --root / --json

SCAN_ID=<paste-scan-id-from-step-3>

# Dry run — materializes a frozen plan manifest.
genie sec remediate --dry-run --scan-id "$SCAN_ID"

# Review the plan: every action class is listed with the target and exit criteria.
cat "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$SCAN_ID/plan.json" | jq '.actions[] | {type, target, reason}'

# Apply — typed per-action consent is required interactively.
genie sec remediate --apply --plan "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$SCAN_ID/plan.json"

genie sec remediate --resume "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$SCAN_ID/resume.json"

# Preferred: restore from a snapshot/image predating 2026-04-21.
zfs list -t snapshot | awk '$1 ~ /@2026-04-2[01]/'
aws ec2 describe-snapshots --owner-ids self --filters Name=start-time,Values=2026-04-20*

# bun cache — versions 4.260421.33 through 4.260421.40
for v in 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40; do
  rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.${v}@@@1
  rm -rf ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.${v}@@@1
done

# pgserve — 1.1.11 through 1.1.14
for v in 11 12 13 14; do
  rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.${v}@@@1
  rm -rf ~/.cache/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.${v}@@@1
done

# Globally installed copies
bun pm uninstall -g @automagik/genie pgserve 2>/dev/null || true
npm uninstall -g @automagik/genie pgserve 2>/dev/null || true

genie sec verify-install
genie sec scan --all-homes --root "$PWD" --json > /tmp/rescan.json

# Status MUST now be NO FINDINGS. If it still reports LIKELY AFFECTED:
# a cache entry was missed. Re-run Step 1.
jq -r '.status' /tmp/rescan.json

bun install -g @automagik/genie@^4.260422.4
bun install -g pgserve@^1.1.10

# bun cache (even if empty manifests, clear the names)
rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/@automagik/genie@4.260421.*@@@1
rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/pgserve@1.1.1[1-4]@@@1

# Shell history entries mentioning compromised versions
for h in ~/.bash_history ~/.zsh_history; do
  [ -f "$h" ] || continue
  cp -a "$h" "${h}.pre-canisterworm.bak"
  grep -vE 'genie@4\.260421\.(3[3-9]|40)|pgserve@1\.1\.(1[1-4])' "${h}.pre-canisterworm.bak" > "$h" || true
done

genie sec scan --all-homes --root "$PWD" --json > /tmp/rescan.json
# Expected: NO FINDINGS.
jq -r '.status' /tmp/rescan.json

# Bulk rollback: walks $GENIE_SEC_AUDIT_LOG in reverse for this scan_id.
genie sec rollback "$SCAN_ID"

# Per-item: if you only need to restore a specific quarantine id.
genie sec quarantine list
genie sec restore <quarantine-id>

# Incident id MUST come from the pinned rotation issue; do not invent one.
genie sec remediate --apply \
  --plan "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$SCAN_ID/plan.json" \
  --unsafe-unverified "SIGNING_CERT_IDENTITY_20260423"
# Typed ack prompt: I_ACKNOWLEDGE_UNSIGNED_GENIE_SIGNING_CERT_IDENTITY_20260423

jq -r 'select(.event=="remediate.apply.start" and .unsafe_unverified != null)' \
  "$GENIE_SEC_AUDIT_LOG"
# Expect a single entry whose incident_id matches the rotation issue number.

genie sec remediate --apply \
  --plan "$GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/$SCAN_ID/plan.json" \
  --unsafe-unverified "PRE_SIGNING_CHANNEL_260423"
# Typed ack prompt: I_ACKNOWLEDGE_UNSIGNED_GENIE_PRE_SIGNING_CHANNEL_260423

genie sec remediate --apply \
  --plan "$FIXTURE_DIR/plan.json" \
  --unsafe-unverified "TEST_HARNESS_CANISTERWORM_FIXTURE" \
  --auto-confirm-from "$FIXTURE_DIR/consent.json"
# Typed ack prompt: I_ACKNOWLEDGE_UNSIGNED_GENIE_TEST_HARNESS_CANISTERWORM_FIXTURE

# Post-mortem: CanisterWorm exposure on <host or fleet scope>

## Metadata
- Scan id:          <paste from `genie sec scan --json`>
- Scan bands hit:   LIKELY COMPROMISED / LIKELY AFFECTED / OBSERVED ONLY (delete two)
- Detection time:   <ISO-8601 UTC>
- Containment time: <ISO-8601 UTC>
- Runbook branch:   §11.3 / §11.4 / §11.5

## Exposure
- Affected versions installed: <list @automagik/genie + pgserve versions>
- Install method:              <bun / npm / CI / auto-update>
- Window of exposure:          <from when the compromised version landed to when the host was contained>
- Material at risk:            <paste `at-risk local material present on host` from scan report>

## Actions taken
- Scan report:   $GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/<scan_id>/report.json
- Plan manifest: $GENIE_HOME/sec-scan/<scan_id>/plan.json
- Audit log:     $GENIE_SEC_AUDIT_LOG (filter on scan_id)
- Rollback used? yes / no (if yes, reason)
- --unsafe-unverified used? yes / no (if yes, which legitimate context from §11.7)

## Credential rotation
- npm:        rotated at <time> · verified with `npm whoami`
- GitHub:     rotated at <time> · verified with `gh auth status`
- AWS:        rotated at <time> · verified with `aws sts get-caller-identity`
- GCP:        rotated at <time>
- Azure:      rotated at <time>
- Kubernetes: rotated at <time>
- Docker:     rotated at <time>
- AI keys:    rotated at <time> · 72h billing audit clean? yes / no
- Crypto:     wallets moved to new seed on clean device? yes / no / N/A
- TLS:        certs re-issued? yes / no / N/A

## Timeline
- <ISO>  Scanner flagged host.
- <ISO>  Egress blocked at perimeter.
- <ISO>  `genie sec remediate --dry-run --scan-id ...` reviewed.
- <ISO>  `genie sec remediate --apply ...` completed.
- <ISO>  Credential rotation completed.
- <ISO>  Host rebuilt / snapshot restored.
- <ISO>  Re-scan returned NO FINDINGS.

## Lessons learned
- <what the compromise window cost>
- <what would have shortened detection>
- <what policy/tooling change lands this week>

## Attachments
- Process snapshot: /tmp/ps-snapshot-*.txt
- Re-scan report:   /tmp/rescan.json
- C2 egress logs:   <link>